Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1963

Dyle E. Stone v. Hurst Lumber Company : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Dale T. Browning; Phillip H. Browning; Attorneys for Appellants;
Patterson, Foley and Phillips; Attorneys for Respondent;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Stone v. Hurst Lumber Co., No. 9879 (Utah Supreme Court, 1963).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/4228

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

Case No. 9879

ED

In the Supremefn
of the State of ·U~_ 1 n 1963
DYLE E. STONE,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

vs.
HURST LUMBER COMPANY,

Defendant-Appellant

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

,_-,·,;t.'P,~\ff
....

\)~1,,

A ppeaI f rom t h e J udgment of the
2nd District Court of Weber County
Hon. John F. Wahlquist, Judge.

of

01 ~

OC.1, ')'" {' \9)53
w;,J

'IWf~

\ /;,."\. ~~ \ ~-~J}:i~

V ' ,.,., ·""

Patterson, Foley and Phillips
427-27th Street
Ogden, Utah
Attorneys for Respondent
Dale T. Browning
Phillip H. Browning
517 Eccles Building
Ogden, Utah
Attorneys for
Appellants

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

II

INDEX
Page
STATE:MENT OF KIND OF CASE ________________________________ 1
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT ______________________________ 1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL --·---------···-······-·--··--···· 1
STATEMENT OF FACTS------------------------------------------··-· 1
ARGUJ\.1ENT --------------------------------···-·-·····----------------------------- 3
POINT I. THE PLAINTIFF HAS SOME DIFFICULTY IN DE1TERJ\fiNING THE NATURE OF THE DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENT ON THIS POINT ----------···-···------------------------- 3
POINT II. THE COURT ERRED IN THAT
THERE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PLAINTIFF FOR THE QUESTION OF NEGLIGENCE TO BE SUBJ\.1ITTED TO A JURY ________ 8
POINT III. AND IV. NO ARGU!1ENT IS MADE
ON EITHER POINT III OR IV. NO CASE
IS CITED IN FAVOR OF EITHER POINT
III OR IV IN THE DEFENDANT'S BRIEF ........ 14
POINT V. THE DEFENDANT IMPLIES THAT
THE RULE IS PUNITIVE DAMAGES
WERE NOT PERMITTED IN THIS TYPE
OF CASE. THIS POSITION IS CONTRARY TO THE RESTATEMENT, SECTION 217 "c", SUBSECTION "b"------------···-···-------16

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Page
CONCLUSION ----------------------------------------------------------------------16
CASES CITED
Barney v. Jewell Tea Co. 103, Utah 595 P (2) 878 ________ 4
Brocoo v. Arro Sportswear Co., 154 NYS ( 2) 348 __________ 7
Carr v. Crowell, 171 P (2) 5---------------------------------------------- 5
Charles v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., (7th Cir.
188 Fed. 691 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 7
Felder v. Huston Transit Co. 203 SW(2) 831. _______________ 7
Knight Iron & Metal Co. v. Ardis, 240 Ala. 305,
199 So. 712 ------------------------····---------------------------------------- 7
Murray v. Modoc State Bank, 181 Kan. 642, 312
p ( 2) 309 (1957) ----------------------------------------------------------------11
Nelson v. American-West Africa Line (2d Cir.) 86
Fed. ( 2) 730 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 6
Porter v. Tompson, 357, Mo. 31, 206 SW(2) 512 ____________ 14
Schultz v. Pursell's, Inc., 320 Mass. 579, 70 NE,(2)
526 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 7
TEXTS CITED
Restatement of the Law of Agency, Second Edition,
Section 245 --------------------------------------------------------------------4, 7, 9
Illustrations 1 and 2 ------------------------------------------------------------ 4
Restatement of Law, Section 213 ------------------------------------ 8
Restatement of Law, Section 217 --------------------------------------16
Jones on Evidence, page 257 ----------------------------------------14, 15
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT

of the
STATE OF UTAH
DYLE E. STONE,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

vs.
HURST LUMBER COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellant

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts stated most favorable in favor of the
plaintiff are as follows :
On 12 June 1962, Dyle Stone was a carpenter foreman engraged in the construction of two homes in North
Ogden, Utah, Tr. 13. On that morning a truck driver
for Hurst Lumber Company delivered a load of lumber
to that job. He was requested by Mr. Stone to drop it in
two piles and the truck driver protested doing so. Mr.
Stone then asked that the lumber be tied down so that
it would not scatter and be damaged. He dumped so
that it scattered over the ground, Tr. 15. When Stone
protested, the truck driver grabbed him by one hand and
hit him with his other hand. There had been no cursing
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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or improper language from Stone, Tr. 15-16. The
truck driver had only been on the construction job one
other time when Stone wasn't present, Tr. 20-21.
Stone was taken to the emergency room in the
Dee Hospital where he was seen by Dr. Drew Peterson,
Tr. 36. He had abraisons, a cerebl'tal concussion. He
still suffers from amnesia as to the events in litigation.
He incurred a hospital bill of Forty and noj100 ($40.00)
Dollars, and a doctor's bill of Ninety and noj100 ($90.00)
Dollars, Tr. 25. In addition, he lost a months wages in
the amount of Five Hundred Seventy-seven and 50j100
($577.50) Dollars.
Ronald Stone, a brother of the plaintiff, was not
present but upon learning of the events, went to the
office of the defendant, Tr. 31, advised an agent of
the defendant as to what had happened, Tr. 32. His
response was "I will can him or fire him. He is kind
of hot headed. I warned him before", Tr. 32. A short
while later the driver came and at that time he assaulted Ronald Stone, Tr. 32.
The plaintiff made no effort to offer character
testimony about the defendant's driver. However, over
the objection of the plaintiff, the defendant introduced
testimony from five witnesses, Tr. 60-61, Tr. 63, Tr. 72,
Tr. 78-79·, Tr. 102. Tr. 109, to the effect that its truck
driver was meek, mild and a model of decorum.
As a result of this testimony, which opened the door,
the plaintiff introduced evidence that this driver was
hot tempered, that he didn't get along with the men he
worked with. That he was ready to fight anyone who
teased him, Tr. 113. Further, the evidence showed
2
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that truck drivers in construction tend to be quarrelsom
and hard to get along with, Tr. 115, and that it is difficult to find ones that are not, Tr. 115. That it isn't
u:q.common in the construction industry to find men who
settle disputes with their fists, both on and off the
job, Tr. 44, 46.
From the evidence the jury could well find that
the defendant's truck driver was one of a group that
are inclined to be quarrelsom and that he was typical
in that he was ready to fight.
·The jury could well have found that this was known
to the defendant who had been previously warned to
control himself and that he didn't do so. That as a
result the plaintiff was hurt.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE PLAINTIFF HAS SOME DIFFICULTY IN
DETERMINING THE NATURE OF THE DEFENDANT'S ARGUME.NT ON THIS POINT.
It is true that the plaintiff filed this action on two
counts.
1. Assault and battery occuring in the course of
the man's employment.
2. Negligence in employing a quarrelsom employee.
The court denied the plaintiff's contention on the
first point and refused to submit it to the jury. It is
believed that this was erred because the ruling was
based on the ruling of the Supreme Court in Barney
3
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vs. Jewell Tea Contpany, 103 Utah 595, 139P(2) 878.
Plaintiff has no quarrel with the courts ruling in
the Jewell Tea Co. case. It conforms with the almost
unanimous weight of authority throughout the country
and is substantially within a rule set down in Restatement of the Law of Agency, Second Edition, Section
245, Illustrations 1 and 2. Almost without exception
in cases where an employee is hired to make customer
collection and to report hack to his emplyer, the courts
have found that the employer is not liable for any battery
or force used by the agent. This is exactly the Jewell
Tea Case. However, it is submitted that the plaintiff
has completely failed to understand the law relative to
defendant's- first point. The plaintiff based his position on Section 245 of the Restatement, which provides
as follows:
"A master is subject to liability for the intended
tortious harm by a servant to the person or
things of another by an act done in connection
with the servant's employment, although the act
was unauthorized, if the act was not unexpectable
in view of the duties of the servant."
"a. Types of situations. Whether or not an employment involves, or is likely to lead to, the use
of force against the person or property of another
is a matter of fact to be decided by the trier of
fact. Since opportunities and provocations arise
in a great variety of ways, no attempt is made
to make an exhaustive category of situations in
which the master may be found liable. However,
certain situations recur with sufficient frequency
4
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to call for mention. These occur when the servant: (c) engages in a fight arising out of a
dispute connected with his work for his employer.
In all of these situations the ·liability of the principal depends fundamentally upon the likelihood
of a battery or other tort in view of the kind of
result to be accomplished, the customs of the
enterprise and the nature of the persons normally employed for doing the work."
This case is clearly a case where a dispute arose
out of the mans work for his employer. The truck driver,
a man of quarrelsom tendency objected to an entirely
proper request for handling of a delivery and this
caused an altercration. The facts are almost exactly
in point with the case of Carr vs. Crowell, Cal. 171 P
(2) 5, which was heard some three or four years after
the Jewel Tea Company decision. In th1s particularcase a dispute arose between a general building contractor employee and a subcontractor employee, which
resulted in an altercration and assault, which resulted
when the firm employee threw a hammer at the employee and struck him in the head and seriously injured
him. The Supreme Court of California had no difficulty
in finding for the plaintiff.
"It is settled that an employer is liable for wilful
and malicious torts of his employee committed
in the scope of the employment."
· "Defendant contends that Enloe was not acting
in the scope of his employment when he injured
plaintiff, on the grounds that the throwing of the
hammer did not further defendant's interests

5
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as an employer and that Enloe could not have intended by his conduct to further such interests.
It is sufficient, however, if the injury resulted
from a dispute arising out of the employment.
Under the provisions of section 2338 of the Civil
Code a principal is liable for 'wrongful acts' of
his agent committed 'in and as a part of' the
principal's business. 'It is not necessary that
the assault should have been made 'as a means,
or for the purpose of performing the work he
(the employee) was employed to do.' "
"The employer's responsibility for the tortious
conduct of his employee 'extends far beyond his
actual or possible control over the conduct of
the servant.. It rests n the broader ground that
every man who prefers to manage his affairs
through others remains bound to so manage them
that third persons are not injured by any breach
of legal duty on the part of such others' while
acting in the scope of their employment."
It is quite true that in the Jewell Tea case, the
Supreme Court of Utah disputed from the California
rule and on the facts of the Jewell Tea case it well should
have.
The Restatement of Agency is authority that this
is within the scope of employment, just as it is authority
for the support of the court ruling in Jewell Tea, supra.
Similarly, other courts have come to the same conclusion,
thus in Nelson vs. American-West Africa Line (2d Cir.)
86 Federal (2) 730, the defendant was liable for all
acts of a boatswain who struck a seaman for the purpose

6
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of getting him to work. In Charles vs. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. (7th Cir.) 188 Federal 691, the railroad was
held liable for the act of a conductor who assaulted a
passenger. In Knight Iron & Metal Co. vs. Ardis} 240
Ala. 305, 199 So. 712, the employer was held liable for
the act of a salesman using a pistol during the strike
for the protection of other employees.
In Schultz vs.
Purselfs Inc. 320 Mass. 579, 70 N.E. (2) 526, the manager of a resturant caused the plaintiff who was falsely
accused of disturbing the peace to suffer a beating.
His employer was found liable. In Texas, in the Felder
vs. Huston Transit Co. 203 SW (2) 831, the employer
was found liable for an assault solely because the plaintiff :wouldn't give his name. See also Brocco vs. Arro
Sportswear Co. 154 NYS (2) 348.
It is believed that the staten1ents of the above cases
may best be summarized by the statements to be found
in the Restatement of Agency Comment "I" as follows:
"Fights following arguments. Although a servant is employed in a matter not involving the
use of force, he may nevertheless cause the master
to be liable for its use if he is in a position
which requires contacts with third persons under
circumstances likely to lead to disputes. In determining whether such conduct is in the scope of
employment, the tendency of those engaged in
that kind of work to settle disputes between
them by the use of force is an important matter."
In this case testimony was introduced to the effect
that truck drivers in and about the construction industry
are generally found to be quarrelsom, are frequently

7
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apt to settle disputes with their fists, both on and off
the job and although this testimony was disputed, a
jury had a right to believe that this was in fact true
and that the agent of the defendant fell within that catagory. As a result, it is submitted that this case falls
within the purview of this group of cases which the
Supreme Court in Utah did not have before it in the
Jewell Tea case and that the defendant could and should
have been held liable for a battery committed within
the scope of the defendants agent employment.
POINT II.
THE COURT ERRE1D IN THAT THERE W.AS
NOT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY
THE PLAINTIFF FOR THE QUESTION OF NEGLIGENCE TO BE SUBMITTED TO A JURY.
The defendant's statement of the law as set forth
in his brief is in substance correct. However, it is believed that the rule is better set forth in Restatement
of Law Agent Section 213:
"A person conducting an activity through servants or other agents is subject to liability for
harm resulting from his conduct if he is negligent
or reckless :
(a) in giving improper or ambiguous orders or
in failing to make proper regulations; or
(b) in the employment of improper persons or
instrumentalities in work involving risk of harm
to others."
8
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Comment "d" provides:
"d. Agent dangerous. The principal may be negligent because he has reason to know that the
servant or other agent, because of his qualities,
is likely to harm others in view of the work or
instrumentalities entrusted to him. If the dangerous quality fo the agent caused harm, the principal may be liable under the rule that one initiating
conduct having an undue tendency to cause harm
is liable therefor. See the Restatement of Torts,
*308.
The dangerous quality in the agent may consist
of his incompetence or unskillfulness due to his
youth or his lack of experience with reference
to the act to be performed. An agent, although
otherwise competent, may be incompetent because
of his reckless or vicious disposition, and if a
principal, without exercising due care in selection, employs a vicious person to do an act which
necessarily brings him in contact with others
while in the performance of a duty, he is subject
to liability for harm caused by the vicious propensity. The negligence may be in entrusting
an agent with instrumentalities which, in connection with his known propensities and the
qualities of the instrumentalities constitute an
undue risk to third persons. These propensities
may be either viciousness, thoughtlessness, or
playfulness."
The rule is further found in Section 245, Comment "g":
"g. Non-delegable duties and dangerous servants.

9
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If the servant commits an assault or battery in a
spirit of play or wholly by way of revenge or
other personal motive, the master may be liable
because of his duty to protect the other, as stated
in Section 214, or because he has negligently or
unknowingly employed a servant having such propensities that he should have known that he was
creating an undue chance of harm to third persons by employing the servant or entrusting him
with the instrumentality 1n question, as stated
in Section 213."
Here we have a man who comes from a group
that the jury could well find to be undisputed, argumentative, quarrelsom, that the agent was in fact in
that class. It is not denied that without any provocation, he struck the plaintiff causing amnesia, and
inability to work for 30 days and,One Hundred Twentyone and noj100 ($121.00) Dollars worth of doctor and
hospital bills. That he was in fact dangerous cannot
be and is not denied. T4e only question was not
whether the agen~ was dangerous but whether the defendant had knowledge of that point. It is submitted
that actual proof of the knowledge was demonstrated
in two counts, one directly, and second indirectly:
1. The evidence was that the supervisor of the
truck driver knew that he was hot headed. He had
warned him that there would be a demonstration of his
temper. How could this knowledge be acquired and
why would there have been any necessity to issue a
warning~ What was that warning~ It is respectfully
submitted that that warning was that if he didn't control
his temper he would be discharged. Why~ The answer

10
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to this is supplied sin1ply by the fact that without any
inquiry as whether or not the employee was right or
actually without any effort to determine what if any
reason existed or any of the fairness that every American citizen is entitled to he was summarily discharged.
This only makes sense in the case of a known offender
who had gone once to often to the well.
2. The indirect testimony is to the effect that this
man was a known quarrelsom individual who could not
get along with his fellow employees, who was willing
to fight at the drop of a hat and would not take needling or teasing. He was the type of man that one
could and would ordinarily expect to do the act that
caused the violence to the plaintiff. True, it is that
the employer and all of its employees testified as to the
sweet nature of this man but no testimony was offered
from any other source that verified the reason as to
his nature, reputation and character.
The defendant quoted at length from Murray vs.
Modoc State Bank) 181 Kan. 642, 313 P2 309 (1957).
However, an examination of the facts involved did not
permit the interpretation given by the defendant. It is
correct that the plaintiff has been threatened and that
some overt act in the matter of assault had been committed upon him, that no injury had ever been received
by the plaintiff until the offense involved. It is not
the law that to put an employer on notice there has to
be a second battery of the injured person, similar to
the doctrine that every dog is entitled to two bites. The
law does not require the plaintiff to produce evidence
of a prior assault. The law only requires that the man
11
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have the propensities for such action and that the
employer knew or should have known thereof. In this
case we are not concerned with what the employer
should have known, the defendant admitted its knowledge of his temper and of his disposition. It had the
duty then to act to protect its customers and general
public. When it failed to do so, it voluntarily
exposed others to the risk of its employee's hot temper
by giving its agent another chance after a warning, it
unnecessarily, unreasonably and negligently exposed
someone, in this case the plaintiff, to the risk of serious
injury. The jury found that this is what happened and
that the defendant did have prior knowledge of the
character and nature of its agent and that in permitting
him to work that it did in fact expose the plaintiff to an
unreasonable risk and harm. The trial court so instructed the jury:
"Before you can return a verdict for the plaintiff, you must find by a preponderance of the
evidence that each of the following propositions
are true:
That the defendant company was negligent in
that it
A) Had an employee that was "dangerous" to
the public when employed as a deliveryman. By "dangerous" is meant that he was
inclined to violence; because, he habitually
lost his temper or habitually deliberately
inflicted violence on others, or because if a
combination of a tendency toward loss of
temper and deliberate violence.

12
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B) That said employee's tendency to violence
was of such a magnitude that a reasonably
prudent employer knowing of such tendency
and using ordinary care for the safety of
his business contacts would not employ him
as a deliveryman.
C) That the defendant company either knew of
such a tendency in that magnitude or in the
exercise of ordinary care should have known
of it.
Proposition No. 2:
That the said negligence of the defendant, if any,
was the proximate cause of the injury. That is,
it was reasonably foreseable that the deliveryman might eventually get into a dispute concerning deliveries of supplies and strike someone
and that said event did in fact occur.
If you find that the two foregoing propositions
are true, you should determine the damages
sustained by the plaintiff according to the instructions hereinafter given to you on that subject."
The defendant did not object to the accuracy of
the above statement of law and by its own citation it
was in no position to do so. Its position is that there
was not sufficient evidence of what the jury found to
be facts because their testimony was contradictory. This
is not the basis for an appeal because in every trial
there is a dispute of the facts. The very function of a
jury trial is to have a group of citizens detennine what

13
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the facts are. This was done in this case and the defendant is in no better position to dispute that finding
than would be the plaintiff had the jury found the facts
against him and in accordance with the evidence of the
defendant ..
The other case that the plaintiff cites. Porter vs.
Thompson, 357, Mo. 31, 206 SW (2) 512, was not decided
by reason of lack of evidence of the vicious tendency
of the agent, although the only evidence was that the
employee on previous occasion had been rude and
threatening. The court found that this was enough to
find that the agent was in fact vicious but found for
the defendant because the defendant did not know of
these propensities and the plaintiff had failed in his
proof relative to this issue.
Here there is no problem about notice, the defendant admitted its knowledge.

POINT III AND IV.
NO ARGUMENT IS MADE ON EITHER POINT
III OR IV. NO CAsg IS CITED IN FA-VOR OF
EITHER POINT III OR IV IN THE DEFENDANT'S
BRIEF.
The law generally in case of assault is found in
Jones on Evidence, page 257. "In all similar actions,
the fact or repudiation of all parties is deemed by the
law to be irrevelant in determining the merits of the
controversy* * * Character evidence is held to be irrevelant to the issues presented in cases of assault and
battery."

14
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The plaintiff's case adhered to this rule and did
not offer any evidence of the character of the defendant. On the contrary, an examination of the transcript shows that the plaintiff carefully refrained from
affirming such evidence.
Notwithstanding that, the defendant introduced
such evidence five times through five different witnesses
and over the objection of the plaintiff. The defendant
voluntarily introduced the evidence as to the nature and
character of its employee. Assuming that the rule is
as layed down, if the defendant voluntarily ignored the
rule, it waived its application to the case. It cannot
now hide behind it when contrary evidence is introduced.
Actually the witnesses character and reputation in
the sense here used are synonymous Jones on Evidence:
"The reputation of a man is the common report
which others make about him, the talk about him
which shows the opinion in which he is held in
his community; and a witness who has not
heard a person discussed or spoken of is not
competent to testify to his good reputation.
Clearly, too, character evidence must not be too
remote in point of time."
It is difficult to understand what the defendant is
contending herein by reason of its silence on this subject, unless it is to argue the fact that the defendant
changes ~is way of life as of a certain hour and day,
somewhat in the nature of Lazarus, who arose from
the dead. This is not the law, has not been and was not

15
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the law and the defendant has cited not one case to
support the contention to the contrary.
It is submitted that this point fails first because
the defendant has failed to meet the burden imposed
upon it in the later, and second because there is no
authority for such position.
POINT V.
THE DE1FENDANT IMPLIES THAT THE RULE
ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES WERE NOT PERMITTED IN THIS TYPE OF CASE. THIS POSITION
IS CONTRARY TO THE RESTATEMENT, SECTION 217 "c", SUBSECTION "b":
"(b) the agent was unfit and the principal was
reckless in employing him."
"Punitative damages can properly be awarded
against the master or other principal because
of the act of the agent, because if, and only if,
the agent was unfit and the principal was reckless in employing him."
The jury found that this procedure was met. It is
submitted that the evidence adequately supports that.
CONCLUSION
It is submitted that the defendant 1n its brief
acknowledged the weakness of its position when it states
at page 20, "The facts and evidence in this case are
hard put to show negligence alone."

16
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The ruling in Utah and elsewhere is that the
jury verdict will be upheld if there is any competent
evidence of the act to support that verdict.
It is believed that the above statement concedes in
fact, the consensus of that evidence. That is all that
is necessary to sustain the action of the jury.

We respectfully submit that the verdict in favor
of the plaintiff as found by the jury and upheld by the
trial court should be sustained.
Respectfully submitted,
PATTERSON, FOLEY & PHILLIPS
C. C. PATTERSON,
Attorney for Plaintiff

17
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

